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# Rebalancing the Republic: Electoral Reform Options for Mauritius

A governance-led comparison of electoral reform choices, trade-offs and implementation constraints.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

# Rebalancing the Republic: Electoral Reform Options for Mauritius

The report treats electoral reform as an institutional design problem: representation, governability, legitimacy, constitutional fit, implementation and unintended effects must be assessed together.

## Why it matters

A reform can solve one visible distortion while creating a less visible governance problem. Comparative options therefore need explicit criteria, not only political preference.

**01 Criteria must precede options**

Representation, stability, accountability and constitutional feasibility should be made explicit before models are compared.

**02 Transition design is substantive**

Timetables, boundaries, institutions, voter understanding and legal sequencing can determine the result as much as the chosen formula.

**03 Trade-offs cannot be abolished**

Reform can rebalance objectives, but no system maximises every democratic value simultaneously.

## SYNOPSIS

# The analytical case

## Purpose and scope

The report provides a disciplined basis for comparing electoral-system options without treating any institutional model as a slogan.

## Decision framework

Options are assessed against representation, governability, accountability, inclusion, transparency, constitutional feasibility and transition risk.

## Principal conclusion

Reform is credible when the objective, trade-off and implementation route are stated together.

FULL HTML COMPANION / PDF EXTRACT

# Report structure

## 1. Define the problem precisely

Electoral reform debates often combine several aims that do not point to the same solution. The first task is to separate the problems being addressed.

A clear baseline should show which outcomes are considered inadequate and which democratic values require protection.

## 2. Compare institutional effects

Every model changes incentives, representation and the relationship between voters, parties and government.

The comparison should include second-order effects rather than stop at the allocation formula.

## 3. Design a lawful transition

Institutional legitimacy depends on legal clarity, public comprehension, administrative readiness and an implementation sequence that can withstand challenge.

## METHODOLOGY &amp; STATUS

# Publication control

Comparative governance framework. Production content must be reconciled with the original report during migration.

## Limitations

Representative demonstrator content only; not a substitute for the original publication or legal advice.

## Suggested citation

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